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Chapter 3 
Social Grants to Fight Poverty: Policy 
Development, Achievements and 
Limitations 
KUMIKO MAKINO 
IN TRODUCTION 
Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has seen economic growth and established itself 
as one of the "emerging economies" in the world. Thanks to affirmative action and other 
policy initiatives to empower the historically disadvantaged population, there has emerged 
a significant black middle class, who are often dubbed ''black diamonds." On another 
front, however, poverty is still prevalent, and the fight against it is a great challenge for 
South Africa. Although South Africa is far richer than other countries on the continent, 
more than half the population is estimated to be living below the poverty line of R577 
per person per month (Statistics South Africa 2012b)l. 
Although there is a wide range of policies that can affect income distribution, the 
centre of the ANC government's fight against poverty has been income support through 
social grants. Therefore this chapter focuses on social grant provision as one of the key 
policy areas for transformation in post-apartheid South Africa. The social grant 
programme in South Africa is one of the largest cash transfer schemes in developing 
countries, and it has attracted wide international attention as a successful model of 
poverty alleviation. While many studies have been made regarding the impact of social 
grants on the poverty situation (e.g. Ardington and Lund 1995; Case and D eaton 1998; 
Duflo 2000; Woolard and Leibbrandt 2010; DSD, SASSA and UNICEF 2012), a political 
1 R577 per person per month is the upper poverty line, which refers to the food poverty line (R305) plus 
the average amount derived from non-food items of households whose total food expenditure is equal to 
the food poverty line (Statistics South Africa 2012b: 5). 
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analysis of welfare policy making has been relatively less developed, with some notable 
exceptions Gohnson 2000; Sagner 2000; Seek.ings 2005; 2008). To study the issue from the 
latter perspective is important, however, as the size of the current programme is a result 
of layers of past political decisions, both in the apartheid and post-apartheid eras, which 
were often made not on economically rational considerations, but for political or 
ideological reasons. This chapter tries to fill the gap by examining the process of 
development in social grant policy. 
The chapter is structured as follows. I will fust present a rough sketch of poverty and 
inequality in South Africa since the end of apartheid, followed by a current and historical 
overview of social grants in the country. Then I will examine public policy discourse and 
policy development regarding social grants since democratisation, and explore how social 
grants have become such a large programme and have moved to centre stage in the fight 
against poverty. The final section examines the remaining challenges and prospects for the 
future. 
1. POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN THE POST-APARTHEID ERA 
According to the latest census results, the average annual household income more than 
doubled in the period between 2001 and 2011. There are significant differences between 
the races; the average annual income for White-headed households was six times that of 
African-headed households in 2011. While the rate of increase for the ten years was 
bigger for African-headed households than White, Coloured or Indian/ Asian households, 
one could not deny that the racial inequality which was characteristic of the apartheid 
state remains after democratisation (Table 1). 
Table 1 Average Annual Household Income by Type of Household Head (Rand) 
2001 2011 Change(%) 
African 22,522 
Coloured 51,440 
Indian/ Asian 102,606 
White 193,820 
Total 48,385 
Source: Statistics South Africa (2012a: 36-37). 
60,613 
112,172 
251,541 
365,134 
103,204 
169.1 
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145.2 
88.4 
113.3 
Note: The figures shown in the table are in nominal terms. The Consumer Price Index 
increased by 77.5% in the period (Statistics South Africa 2012a: 37). 
In addition to the stark inter-racial inequality, there is an increasing level of intra-racial 
inequality, especially within the African population. According to Bhorat and others, while 
the Gini coefficient for the total population increased from 0.64 in 1995 to 0.72 in 2005, 
intra-racial inequality for all four population groups also widened. The Gini coefficient 
was highest for the African population, 0.61 in 2005 (an increase from 0.56 in 1995), 
Social Grants Lo Fight Poverty 35 
while the same year's figures for the ~te, Asian, and Coloured counterparts were 0.51 
(0.44),0.56 (0.46) and 0.59 (0.49) respectively (Bhorat, Van der Westhuizen and Jacobs 
2009: Table 2). 
While the inequality, both between the races and within the races, has worsened since 
the end of apartheid, there has been some improvement in the poverty situation, 
although it has been slow. In the early 2000s, many researchers argued that both inequality 
and poverty worsened after the end of apartheid (e.g. Meth and Dias 2004; Hoogeveen 
and Ozler 2006). However, recent research using newer data shows the poverty headcount 
(incidence of poverty) and the poverty gap (depth of poverty) decreased between 1995 
and 2005 (Bhorat and van der Westhuizen n.d. [2008?]). This reduction in poverty seems 
to have much to do with the expansion of social grants in the 2000s. According to 
Woolard and Leibbrandt (201 0), if there had not been social grants, poverty would have 
worsened during the period from 1993 to 2008. 
Interestingly, while social grants serve to reduce poverty, Bhorat and others observed 
no impact on the Gini coefficient. They argue this is probably because not only the 
poorest households but also households in middle-income deciles are receiving social 
grants (Bhorat, Van der Westhuizen and Jacobs 2009: 18-19). In other words, social grants 
in South Africa are not a relief for the few, narrowly targeted poor who are in exceptional 
circumstances, but they have a relatively wide coverage. 
2. OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL GRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 The CurrentS ocial Grant System 
Currently, there are several kinds of social grants for elderly persons, persons with 
disabilities and children up to the age of 18 in South Africa. As of September 2012, there 
are 16 million beneficiaries of one kind of social grant or other, of which 11.3 million are 
receiving the Child Support Grant (CSG), followed by the Old Age Grant (or social 
pension as it is widely known) and the Disability Grant (fable 2, Figure 1). Social grants 
are non-contributory, means-tested cash transfers, in contrast to social insurance benefits, 
which are based on contribution records. Although they are means-tested, the criteria are 
not so selective. It is estimated that the coverage for social pensions is about 80% of the 
population of eligible age, and 70% for children of eligible age are beneficiaries of the 
CSG (Garcia and Moore 2012: 52-53). 
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Table 2 Social Grants in South Africa 
Maximum Monthly Number of 
Grant Type Beneficiaries Amount Payable as of Beneficiaries as of 
April2012 30 September 2012 
Old Age People who are 60 years or older R1200 2,811,380 
Grant (social (R1220 if 75 years or 
pension) older) 
War Veteran's Former soldiers who fought in the R1220 641 
Grant First World War (1904-1918), the 
Second World War (1939-1945), the 
Z ulu uprising (1906) or the Korean 
War 
Disability People with a physical or mental R1200 1,187,457 
Grant disability which makes one unfit to 
work for a period of longer than six 
months 
Grant-in-Aid Additional grant for recipients of a R280 69,965 
Disability Grant, a War Veteran's 
Grant or an Old Age Grant who are 
not able to look after themselves 
owing to their physical or mental 
disabilities, and therefore need 
full-time care from someone else 
Care Parent, primary caregiver, or foster R1200 per child 118,769 
Dependency parent who takes care of a child who 
Grant is younger than 18 years old and has 
a severe disability and is in aeed of 
full-time and special care 
Foster Child Foster parents of foster children R770 per child 585,699 
Grant who have been placed in their 
custody by a court as a result of 
being orphaned, abandoned, at risk, 
abused or neglected 
Child Support Primary caregivers of children up to R280 per child 11,306,024 
Grant the age of 18 years 
Total 16,009,970 
Source: South Africa Government Services (http:/ /www.services.gov.za/, accessed 11 
January 2013); SASSA (2012b). 
Note: The total does not include Grant-in-Aid. 
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Figure 1 Number of Beneficiaries of Social Grants, FY1996/97- FY2011/12 ('000) 
18,000 
16,000 
14,000 
12,000 
10,000 Other Grants 
8,000 Child Support Grant 
6,000 • Disability Grant 
4,000 i • Old Age Grant 2,000 i I 0 
Source: SASSA (2009; 2012a). 
Note: Other grants include the War Veteran's Grant, the Care Dependency Grant 
and the Foster Child Grant. 
In the rest of the chapter, my argument will concentrate on the two largest 
programmes, i.e. the CSG and the Old Age Grant. This is not to deny the importance of 
the other social grants, especially the Disability Grant and Foster Child Grant in the 
context of the high prevalence of HIV /AIDS, but it is because the CSG and the Old Age 
Grant represent the unique character of social grants in South Africa. 
2.2 Historical Development of Social Grants 
Although the CSG is currently the largest social grant programme in terms of the 
number of beneficiaries, the social pension has historically been the most important 
programme in public income support for African households. 
The history of the Old Age Grant started in the 1920s when the social pension was 
introduced for Whites and Coloureds as part of the solution for the "poor white" 
problem after the South African War (Sagner 2000). It was later extended to Africans in 
1944. As for the background to this extension, Seekings points out that liberal thinking 
was influential during the Second World War, particularly as a result of the Beveridge 
Report in the United Kingdom. The collapse of subsistence agriculture in the African 
reserves due to overpopulation and overgrazing were also of concern to the government 
(Seekings 2005). The crisis in the African reserves meant an increase in labour costs for 
the mining sector, which was dependent on the "cheap labour" provided by the reserves 
which bore the reproduction cost of labour. In this context, social pensions for Africans 
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not only helped Africans to survive, but they also served as indirect support for the 
mining sector (Sagner 2000). 
Although the amount of the pension for Africans was much lower than that for Whites, 
it still became an important source of income for Mrican households under the apartheid 
regime (Wilson and Ramphele 1989). After the character of the labour market shifted 
from a labour shortage to a labour surplus in the late 1970s, and chronic mass 
unemployment among Africans began (Seekings and Nattrass 2005), its importance for 
the livelihood of Mrican households arguably increased. In the racialised labour market, 
the burden of unemployment was concentrated on the Africans, and it was particularly 
severe in the rural areas. In such circumstances, the social pension was often the sole 
form of income for entire households (Human Awareness Programme 1984: 8) 
There was a huge racial difference in the amount of the pension in the 1960s, but the 
gap started to decrease in the 1970s and it was equalized between the races by 1993. This 
was achieved mainly by drastically decreasing the grant amounted to Whites in real terms, 
while at the same time gradually increasing the grant amount for other populations. The 
slash in the pension amount for Whites was politically possible because most Whites no 
longer relied on the social pension as their main source of income after retirement. Due 
to racial privilege in areas such as the labour market and education, many White workers 
came to obtain stable jobs with social security arrangements such as membership of 
retirement funds, while this was not the case for most Africans. As a result, by the end of 
the apartheid era, most of the recipients of the social pension, which was for elderly 
persons who could not rely on other sources of income, were Africans (Van der Berg 
1997; 1998). 
Regarding social grants for children, Mrican children in single parent households were 
mostly excluded from receiving the State Maintenance Grant (SMG) (Lund Committee 
1996). It was after the new CSG was introduced in 1998 to replace the SMG following the 
recommendation by the Lund Committee on Child and Family Support that many 
African households became able to have access to social grants for children. More details 
of the process will be provided in the next section. 
3. POLICY DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL GRANTS AFTER 
DEMOCRATISATION 
3.1 The Social Pension Re-Positioned in the Developmental Context 
In 1994, the ANC declared in its election manifesto, the Reconstruction and 
D evelopment Programme (RDP), that it would tackle poverty as its first priority. "[A]n 
election victory is only a first step. No political democracy can survive and flourish if the 
mass of our people remain in poverty, without land, without tangible prospects for a 
better life. Attacking poverty and deprivation must therefore be the first priority of a 
democratic government" (ANC 1994: 1.2.9). Since the ANC assumed power, it has been 
social grants that have repeatedly been cited as evidence that the ANC was taking the 
problem of poverty seriously. For instance, in 1998, Trevor Manuel, the Minister of 
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Finance at the time, stated in his annual Budget Speech as follows: 
One of the most redistributive spending programmes is social security and 
welfare. Social grants are paid to over 3 million beneficiaries, and are a crucial 
source of income to poor households, particularly in rural areas. Welfare and 
social security spending represents Government's primary investment in poverty 
alleviation (Manuel 1998). 
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It should be noted, however, that the CSG had not yet been introduced at the time of this 
speech, and the social grants that were being delivered at that time were the same as those 
under the apartheid regime. In other words, the social security system that the ANC 
government inherited from the previous regime was already somewhat redistributive. As 
noted in the previous section, although African families could not have access to social 
grants for children before the CSG was introduced, most of the recipients of social 
pensions were already Africans by the end of the apartheid regime, and racial 
discrimination in the amount payable was also abolished by 1993. 
The importance of the social pension for the survival of impoverished African 
households had already been pointed out in the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty in 
the 1980s (Wilson and Ramphele 1989). In addition, in the 1990s, more studies 
demonstrated the positive effects of social pensions for poverty alleviation. What was 
particularly important, among other results, was the finding that the social pension had 
positive impacts on the health and educational status of young African children living 
with pensioners. Legally speaking, the social pension is meant for elderly persons as 
individuals; in practice, however, studies showed that the social pension was being shared 
with family members and therefore contributed to the poverty alleviation of entire 
households, rather than just supporting the lives of individual elderly persons (e.g. 
Ardington and Lund 1995; Case and D eaton 1998). Such research findings greatly helped 
to introduce into public policy discourse the idea that social grants are "developmental", 
rather than just a "hand out". 
The Smith Committee on Strategy and Policy Review of Retirement Provision 
exemplifies this point. In 1995, the government commissioned the Smith Committee to 
conduct research and make recommendations about the retirement provision system, 
including the social pension (which is non-contributory) and the retirement fund schemes 
(which are contributory). In the Committee, Pieter le Roux, who was professor at 
University of Western Cape and a committee member, presented a strong argument that 
the social pension was well targeted at poorer households and is used by many extended 
families for developmental purposes Qe Roux 1995). Although there were concerns 
expressed in the committee about the fiscal sustainability of the social pension as well as 
its possible negative impact on incentives for workers to provide from their earnings, the 
Smith Committee eventually acknowledged that <'the old age assistance system [i.e. social 
pension] has a uniquely successful form of poverty relief and redistribution" and 
recommended that it be retained as "the centrepiece which other forms of provision 
must support" (Smith Committee 1995: 29, 31). The government accepted the 
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recommendation, and the social pension was retained. 
3.2 Introduction and Subsequent Expansion rif the CSG 
U alike the social pension, one can observe a clear break from the apartheid era as well as 
a significant policy change since democratisation in the area of social grants for children. 
While it was decided to maintain the social pension soon after democratisation, it 
should be noted that fiscal constraints did affect social policy development in the late 
1990s. Although the RDP in 1994 reiterated the need to address poverty and promised 
redistribution, it was after just two years that a neo-liberal macroeconomic strategy, 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), was introduced in 1996. With the 
GEAR firmly placed at the centre of all policies, the government in the late 1990s 
strongly emphasized fiscal discipline for the sake of macroeconomic stability, and social 
grants were no exception. 
Fiscal constraints were the major reason why the amount of the CSG was initially set 
as low as Rl 00 per month per child, which meant that existing SMG recipients (mainly 
Coloured and Indian/ Asian single mothers) had to face a drastic reduction in the 
amounts they received Gohnson 2000). Looking back at the process of reform for the 
social grants for children, Francie Lund, who was a professor at the University of Natal 
and chaired the Lund Committee, which was instrumental in designing the new CSG, 
recollects that she was advised by Alec Erwin, then deputy minister of finance, that she 
should "take the existence of the fiscal constraint seriously and [ ... ] 'redistribute within 
the existing envelope'," otherwise her recommendation for policy reform would not be 
taken seriously (Lund 2008: 90). As an author of Ardington and Lund (1995), Lund 
believed that social grants could play a positive developmental role, and she had the 
strong will to make social grants available for Mrican children. The initial low amount of 
the CSG was the result of a tight balancing act between the inescapable fiscal pressures 
and the need to achieve equity. 
Not only was the grant amount of CSG low, but it also started very slowly, with only 
150,000 children newly registered for the grant by FY1999 /2000 (see Figure 2 above). 
However, retrospectively, the fact that the Lund Committee managed to succeed in 
pushing through the reform and get it put into practice made room for a huge increase 
both in the number of beneficiaries and the total expenditure for social grants in the 
2000s and afterwards. While the CSG was initially only for children up to six years old, the 
age limit was gradually raised in the 2000s and now it covers children up to 18 years old. 
The grant amount has also been raised over the years. As we have seen already, now the 
number of beneficiaries of the CSG has reached more than 11 million. While the 
conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin American countries absorb much less than 
1% of GDP, the cost of social grants in South Africa is now approximately 3% of GDP 
(Barrientos and Hulme 2009). 
Several elements can be pointed out as background for this expansion. Firstly, the 
govemment's decision to raise the age limit of the CSG was a direct response to the 
report of the Taylor Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social 
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Security for South Africa, which was published in 2002. Although the mandate of the 
Taylor Committee was rather wide (including contributory retirement provision as well as 
a health insurance system), its main recommendation concerned expanding social grants. 
What was particularly notable was that the Committee supported the phasing-in of a 
basic income grant (BIG), or a social grant that is to be paid unconditionally to all 
individuals regardless of age, gender, or labour market status, as a key to eradicating 
extreme poverty. Extending the CSG to children up to 18 years old and making it 
universal (i.e. abolishing the means test) was recommended as the first steps for the 
introduction of a BIG in the future (Taylor Committee 2002a). 
While the government, citing fiscal and other reasons2, rejected the call for a BIG by 
the Taylor Committee and civil society organisations, who supported the idea, it 
nonetheless decided to extend the CSG. It also started to make serious efforts to enrol 
more and more children in the programme (DSD, SASSA and UN1CEF 2012: 30). 
Considering the fact that one of the key arguments for a BIG that was made by its 
proponents in civil society was that the existing social grants were failing to reach many 
people who could qualify because of the problems of the means-test (Basic Income 
Grant Coalition 2003), the government's response, stated above, was probably driven at 
least pardy by a perceived necessity to justify its decision not to introduce a BIG, and to 
demonstrate that the expansion of and improvement in implementation in existing 
programmes were good enough for the purpose of poverty alleviation. 
Secondly, the new constitution matters. In the Bill of Rights of the new post-apartheid 
constitution, which became law in 1996, the right to social security was established as a 
constitutional right. Section 27 of the new constitution reads: "everyone has the right to 
have access to ... social security, including, if they are unable to suppor t themselves and 
their dependants, appropriate social assistance," and "the state must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of each of these rights" 3. Simply put, this clause obliges the government to 
continuously expand the coverage of social security until "everyone" can enjoy the right. 
Children's rights are also established in Section 28 of the constitution. Since the new 
constitution came into effect, these clauses have been used for a number of public 
litigation cases as well as policy advocacy outside courts over the government's obligation 
to realise these rights4. With the Constitutional. Court making several judgements in 
favour of plaintiffs, constitutional socio-economic rights have been gradually 
substantialized. As the Grootboom case, which was a landmark judgment by the 
Constitutional Court about socio-economic rights, was mentioned in the Taylor 
2 While the National Treasury strongly opposed a BIG for fiscal reasons, the government leaders at that 
time often cited normative concerns that able-bodied people should work instead of depending on social 
grants. See Matisonn and Seekings (2003) and Makino (2004) for more detailed discussion about the 
public debate over a BIG in the early 2000s. 
3 "Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996," on the South African Government Information 
website (http:/ /www.info.gov.za/ documents/ constitution/1996/index.htm, accessed 27 January 2013). 
4 The issue of life-saving AIDS drugs, for which a civil society group Treatment Action Campaign 
organised a number of mass actions and fought court cases against the government, best illustrates the 
point (Friedman and Mottiar 2005; Heywood 2005). 
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Committee Report (Taylor Committee 2002b), the government must have been aware of 
the risk of being taken to court over the limited coverage of social grants when it 
considered their extension. 
Thirdly, there is political merit for the government to expand social grants. In the 
manifesto for the 2009 elections, the first thing the ANC had to say about its achievement 
to "push back the frontiers of poverty" was how it had successfully expanded the social 
grant. The manifesto reads: 
In 1996, only 3 million people had access to social grants. Today 12.5 million 
receive social grants. In 1996, only 34,000 children had access to social grants. 
Today nearly 8 million children younger than 14 years receive social grants (ANC 
2009). 
Direct cash transfers in the form of social grants are very tangible, thus it arguably has 
strong political appeal and is useful for consolidating popular support for the government 
and the ruling party. The fact that the social grant programme in South Africa is 
internationally highly acclaimed in the context of increased interest in cash transfer 
programmes for social protection might also be contributing to strengthening the political 
appealS. 
3.3limitation of Existing Social Grants: The Issue of Unemplqyment 
As we have seen, there has been a rapid increase in the coverage of social grants in the 
2000s, and this has contributed to the reduction of poverty both in terms of the poverty 
head count and the poverty gap. There is a serious limitation, however, in fighting against 
poverty solely with the existing social grants. This is because there is limited income 
security for the unemployed, despite a high unemployment rate that exceeds 25%. 
Unemployment is a significant contributor to poverty and inequality in South Mrica. 
The official unemployment rate was 25.5% in the third quarter in 2012, and the rate is 
much higher if discouraged job-seekers are included. Unemployment among the youth is 
particularly alarming: about one third of the youth (15-24 years) are so-called NEET, i.e. 
not in employment, education or training, and the unemployment rate for this age group 
is more than 50% (Statistics South Mrica 2012c). 
The issue of mass unemployment has been a primary concern for the ANC 
government. Its key macroeconomic strategy documents, such as GEAR, Accelerated and 
Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), and the more recent National 
Development Plan, have been organised around the ultimate goal of economic growth 
accompanying job creation. In the recent 53rd ANC National Conference in December 
2012, unemployment, along with poverty and inequality, was again presented as one of 
the elements in the "triple challenge" that the ANC was facing (ANC 2012). Besides 
indirect and medium- to long-term strategies to restructure the economy to increase 
s See Garcia and Moore (2012) for the latest review of cash transfer programmes in Africa. 
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employment, the ANC had already introduced some direct policy measures, of which the 
most notable is the Public Works Programmes (PWPs), to provide short-term work for 
the unemployed. However, PWPs have not covered all the unemployed who wish to 
participate (cf. Haddad and Adato 2001), nor have they provided income for participants 
beyond the programme period of several months to a maximum of two years6. 
Regarding social security measures for the unemployed, there is the unemployment 
insurance fund, which is mandatory for all employees to join. It does not, however, 
provide income security for people in long-term unemployment nor for those with no 
work experience since leaving school. In addition, it should be noted that in South Africa, 
subsistence agriculture is so weak, due to the historical confiscation of productive land by 
White colonisers, that it cannot function as an effective informal social security system, as 
is often the case in other developing countries. People generally depend on cash income 
for a livelihood even in rural areas, and in the context of job scarcity, the social grants for 
the elderly, children and disabled people have often constituted the sole stable source of 
cash income for poor households. As a result, these social grants are often the only social 
security available for those who are able-bodied but without work. 
The practice of sharing social grants among household members has contributed to 
alleviating general poverty. However, we might also point out that there is some danger in 
simply assuming that social grants are shared. Let me illustrate this point using the case of 
the social pension. The social pension has often been described as "generous" (e.g. Duflo 
2000), based on the fact that the amount of the grant is higher than either the per capita 
poverty line or the mean per capita income of the African population. However, in reality, 
it often cannot meet the very basic needs of elderly persons because it is shared among 
family members, particularly when there is no other source of income in the household. 
M0ller and Sotshongaye (1996) found pensioners felt they were impoverished because 
they had to share their pensions with other family members. Sagner and Mtati (1999) also 
demonstrated the pressure for pension sharing by pointing out that pensioners felt they 
would not get necessary care when they got frail, if they did not share their pensions with 
family members. The reasons why social grants are shared may be partly cultural, but they 
are mainly because of the chronic mass unemployment. In this context, policy discourse, 
which conflates existing social grants designed for economically inactive people with a 
general poverty alleviation scheme, could conceal the unsolved problem of a lack of 
income security for the unemployed. 
CONCLUSION 
The social grant programme m South Africa is one of the largest cash transfer 
programmes among developing countries. It has been at the centre of the ANC 
government's fight against poverty, and many studies show that South Africa has indeed 
6 According to the ministerial determination which sets the working conditions for the PWPs, workers on 
the programmes are employed on a temporary basis, and a worker may not be employed for longer than 
24 months in any five-year cycle 
(http:/ /www.epwp.gov.za/Downloads/legal_m.inisterialdetermination.doc, accessed 3 February 2013). 
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been successful in alleviating poverty through the provision of social grants. 
This chapter has examined the process of the historical development of the social 
grant programme in South Mrica, and demonstrated how it has become so big since 
democratisation. We have seen that there was the establishment of a shared recognition 
among experts and policy makers that social grants are an effective poverty alleviation 
tool and that they can play a "developmental" role. This contributed to the maintenance 
of the social pension that the government inherited from the apartheid regime, and to the 
introduction, and afterwards the extension, of the Child Support Grant, even during a 
time of fiscal pressures. Although the neo-liberal macroeconomic framework did affect 
policy development in the 1990s, the social grant programme has expanded both in terms 
of the number of beneficiaries and in terms of the total budget from the 2000s and 
onwards. We also discussed how there were political considerations behind the expansion 
of the social grants, i.e. the government responded to the pressure it received from civil 
society as well as from its own research committee to introduce a basic income grant, or 
to act in accordance with its constitutional obligation to take concrete measures to realise 
the right to social security. 
There is a serious limitation in the existing social grants, however, as is discussed above. 
Despite the fact that the social grant programme is reaching many people, it is not yet 
comprehensive, because there is no social grant provision for adults who are fit to work 
but who are unable to find a job in a society where employment opportunities are scarce. 
What are the prospects for the future regarding the strengthening of income security for 
the unemployed? A youth wage subsidy scheme for companies who recruit new 
employees has been on the agenda for a while, but it has been reported that the powerful 
trade unions are opposed to the idea, fearing it might lead to the replacement of existing 
workers with low-cost young workers7• Recently, another idea of a job-seekers grant, 
which is a social grant for the unemployed and is intended to assist them in their 
job-seeking activities, appeared in the run-up to the ANC National Conference in 2012, 
and the conference's resolution included the statement that it would accelerate "the 
development and implementation of financial support for job-seekers, that is tied to 
compulsory learning and skills development as part of the Comprehensive Social Security 
System" (ANC 2012: 2.4.2.1). Whether these policy ideas will be realised, and in what 
form, however, depends largely on further consideration within the ANC Alliance and in 
the government~ and this still remains to be seen. 
7 
"Youth Wage Subsidy Tops Agenda at ANC Lekgotla," City Press_ 31 January 2013 
(http:/ /www.citypress.eo.za/ politics/ youth-wage-subsidy-tops-agenda-at -anc-lekgotla/, accessed 5 
February 2013). 
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